Several weeks ago I wrote an entry,
"Notes on Egoism," as a kind of thought experiment. I had been reading some Ayn Rand and wanted to see if I agreed with her by fleshing out my thoughts. It's an appealing philosophy--the idea that the only moral command is to pursue your own happiness (with the caveat, of course, that we shouldn't impose ourselves on other people)--but look closely at that entry. I tried to write in her manner, but I couldn't even make it halfway through before the making an apology FOR caring about the needs of other people. I tried to write an accept that point-of-view and couldn't do it.
I've wrestled with that fact since then, and I wanted to talk about it here--to come clean, as it were.
The so-called New Atheists would have us believe that ethics are not only possible without God, but work best without God. Now I'll agree that people don't have believe in a divine power to do good, that's obviously clear. What I take issue with is the notion that, without some kind of absolute source, we have any basis to define what constitutes ethical behavior.
The New Atheists understand that if there is God there is no good or evil, but yet they go on to make the dubious claim that even without some kind of eternal source we have every reason to go on believing in our current ethical system. But if there is no right and there is no wrong than what reason do we have to chose our ethical system over say that of fundamentalist terrorists, or the Nazis, outside of aesthetic reasons? Nietzsche understood this. If you want to see a system of ethics without a God turn to Friedrich.
The New Atheists argue that we have equity as human beings, but that's shaky ground at best. If we're nothing more than complicated beasts, why should we give a wit about the concerns of others? Rand certainly doesn't think we should. If history shows us anything it's how easy it easy it is to reason out that people are not equal, and that some are meant to rule while others to serve. Nietzsche says the weak use morals and virtue to hold the strong back. There's no scientific basis to prove him wrong. In truth, few things seem more "natural" than the dominance of the violent over the meek. Atheists can object to that on aesthetic grounds, but that's just their culture talking.
And which culture is that? A large portion of the virtues we celebrate come from historical Greek philosophy, but equality, human rights--those are religious concepts. Christian concepts, to be exact. The Greeks reasoned out a lot of things, but I don't know of many that deduced that the lofty ideals they wrote so eloquently about extended to all. They granted them to the
polis,
the male citizenry. They did not grant them to slaves, or to women, or to children for that matter. Their ability to reason out all these highfalutin concepts came about precisely because the slave base they held allowed them the leisure time to think them up in the first place (and it's no small coincidence that the beacon of freedom in the modern era was founded on the ideals of slaveholders as well, and originally offered its promise to male landholders).
Logic never gave birth to the radical notion that all people, regardless of tribe or ability were inherently worthy of love and respect. It was brought on by faith. Faith in a spiritual brotherhood that offered us the possibility of being more than slaves and masters. You deny the basis for that faith, a shared creator, and you're left with nothing but the will to power.
At the end of the "Notes on Egoism" post I presented the argument that caring about others is the right thing to do because it promotes a more stable society. I still think it does, but the basis for my goal in making that claim was unsound and shameful. I made a utilitarian appeal to freedom and goodwill's efficiency. Efficiency is not only irrelevant in this case, but a cold and deceptive measure of progress. Not only in politics--take the efficiency of Stalin or Mao or Pol Pot--to economics--the replacement of workers with automated robots--it's clear that the logically efficient thing to do is take most of humanity out of the picture all together.
Note: None of this contradicts my earlier arguments for moral relativism. As I hope I've made clear, my relativistic thought is that it is useless to speak of good and evil outside of context. Murder, for instance, is wrong because the term itself implies a context--an unjustified killing. The problem with my post "Notes on Moral Relativism" is my not making clear that, if we should judge a belief system by its effects, then I'm pre-supposing an ideal to judge them by.